Matt Farr

Department of History and Philosophy of Science | University of Cambridge

I'm a philosopher of science at the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Cambridge. I work on various philosophical problems concerning time, causation and explanation, particularly what it means for time to have a direction. I've previously held postdoctoral research fellowships at the University of Queensland's School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, and the University of Sydney's Centre for Time. I was awarded my PhD in Philosophy by the University of Bristol for my thesis Towards a C Theory of Time. You'll find links to non-paywalled versions of all my published articles on this page.

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Research

Stuff happens. It’s hard to think of a more general description of reality. We picture the universe as some set of processes that start in some state and evolve to some other state, and this idea of an evolving, time directed universe acts as a backdrop for any story we can give of how things happen in the world and why things are the way they are. And yet this mode of describing reality, as a grand time-directed system, is at best a heuristic metaphor, and at worst a fundamentally misleading representation of the world that distorts our understanding of the world. Or so my work argues... + read more about my current research

In more specific terms, I'm interested in what it means for time to have a direction. This question is central to a number of foundational philosophical problems on which I work, such as the nature of causation, the status of the laws of nature, the function of scientific explanation, and how we relate to our future and past selves. I employ an empirically-based methodology, incorporating emerging research in physics and psychology into philosophical debates about time and causation, applying philosophical methods to foundational problems in the sciences, and examining the relationship between science and metaphysics more generally.

My current work covers three main issues.

1. The C Theory of Time. It is popular to picture the world as ‘evolving’ from earlier to later times. This picture is poorly motivated by the kinds of time-asymmetric phenomena in the world, by our experience of time, and by modern physics. Across a number of works, I have put forward and defended the ‘C theory of time’ according to which ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ function as perspectival notions, much like ‘up’ and ‘down’. I my continuing work, I explore the significance of this view for the metaphysics of causation, laws, chance, and modality more generally. This will be the topic of my forthcoming book: Does Time Have a Direction? A defence of the C theory of time.

Relevant works:
• The ABC of Time [Pop-sci article about the C theory]
• C-theories of time: On the adirectionality of time
• Causation and Time Reversal
• On A- and B-theoretic elements of branching spacetimes
• Review of Maudlin
• Towards a C theory of time [PhD thesis]

2. Causation and Physics. What is the status of causation in physics? It is common to provide causal explanations across the sciences, including physics. However, contemporary fundamental theories are ‘non-causal’ in a number of ways. For instance, the time symmetries of classical theories are prima facie at odds with the asymmetry of cause and effect, and the existence of non-local quantum correlations has led many to hold that quantum mechanics is non-causal in structure, or (alternatively) requires retrocausality. My work assesses the significance for causation of spatially and temporally non-local constraints, and defends ‘compatibilist’ accounts of causation, such as agency theories.

Relevant works:
• Causation and Time Reversal
• A relic of a bygone age
• Review of Frisch
• Causation and Quantum Mechanics
• Causal realism in physics [Conference paper]
• Causation, Time Symmetry and Russell's Directionality Argument [Blogpost]

3. Temporal Psychology. How does the physics of time connect to our experience of time? It is commonly held that physics ‘leaves out’ key aspects of our experience of time, namely the distinction between the past, present and future, and the ‘passage’ of time. My work explores this explanatory gap and its parallels with the philosophy of mind. I defend a reductionist account of temporal phenomenology, arguing that our experience of temporal passage just is our experience of change, motion, succession, and other such features of the world well studied by psychophysics. My most recent work looks at emerging empirical research in psychophysics and neuroscience on temporal aspects of perception and memory and how these challenge traditional philosophical theories of the temporally-extended self.

Relevant works:
• Explaining Temporal Qualia [Sets out and defends my reductionist account of temporal experience]
• Temporal Experience, Temporal Passage and the Cognitive Sciences
• Temporal Ontology in Perspective

Teaching

At Cambridge I am available to supervise Philosophy and HPS Part II dissertations and HPSM MPhil essays in the following areas: philosophy of physics; metaphysics of science; scientific explanation; realism and antirealism; laws of nature; time; causation.

In the 2020-2021 year at Cambridge I am running the following courses:

Reichenbach's The Direction of Time. + info

Evidence, Explanation and Models. (With Marta Halina) + info

Philosophy of Psychiatry. + info

The Metaphysics of Physics. + info

Space, Time & Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics. + info

Media

A recent podcast in which I discuss my C-theory of time, and wider issues about the relationship between the physics, psychology, and linguistics of time.

A talk from 2018 on the C theory of time at the London School of Economics.

Misc.

My Erdös number is 5: Erdös→Anderson→Binmore→Paternotte→Ivanova→Me.

Had I been less interested in counterfactuals, I'd probably make my living as a drummer.

I'm happily married to this fellow philosopher, and spend most of my time figuring how to keep our little one entertained.

+ latest news

Publications

Research Articles

Forthcoming. Conventionalism about time direction
Synthese + details

Forthcoming. What's so special about initial conditions? Understanding the past hypothesis in directionless time.
Rethinking the Concept of Laws of Nature, ed. Y. Ben-Menahem. + details

2020. Causation and Time Reversal
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science [preprint] + details

2020. C-Theories of Time: On the adirectionality of time
Philosophy Compass [preprint] + details

2020. Explaining Temporal Qualia
European Journal for Philosophy of Science [preprint] + details

2020. Methods in Science and Metaphysics. [With M. Ivanova]
Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, eds. R. Bliss & J.T.M. Miller. [link to book] + details

2015. Conventional Principles in Science: On the foundations and development of the relativized a priori [With M. Ivanova]
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics [preprint] + details

2015. Temporal Experience, Temporal Passage and the Cognitive Sciences [With S. Baron, J. Cusbert, M. Kon & K. Miller]
Philosophy Compass + details

2013. A Relic of a Bygone Age? Causation, Time Symmetry and the Directionality Argument [With A. Reutlinger]
Erkenntnis [preprint] + details

2012. On A- and B-Theoretic Elements of Branching Spacetimes
Synthese [preprint] + details

Book Reviews

2021. Essay review of Yemima Ben-Menahem's Causation in Science
Mind [preprint] + details

2016. Review of Mathias Frisch’s Causal Reasoning in Physics
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science [preprint] + details

2015. Review of Tim Maudlin’s Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time
Philosophy in Review [preprint] + details

Edited Volumes

2015. Conventional Principles in Science: On the foundations and development of the relativized a priori [With M. Ivanova]
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics + details

PhD Thesis

2013. Towards a C Theory of Time: An Appraisal of the Physics and Metaphysics of Time Direction. University of Bristol. + details

Talks

Upcoming

What is directionless time? + where & when

Previous Talks

What's so special about initial conditions? + venues

Indeterminism and the C theory+ venues

Peceiving direction in directionless time. + venues

The C Theory of Time. + venues

Do we need to explain initial conditions? + venues

Why the passage of time is not an illusion + venues

Explaining Temporal Qualia. + venues

Causation and Time Reversal. + venues

Causal Realism in Physics. + venues

Causality and Retrodiction in Quantum Mechanics. + venues

'Initial' Conditions and the Direction of Time. + venues

Time: Inside and Out. + venues

Supertemporal Ontology and the 'Triviality' Problem. + venues

Explaining Time and Time Explaining. + venues

Does time have a direction? + venues

Difference-Making and the Direction of Time. + venues

Non-Reductive Naturalism about Time Direction? + venues

On Some Problems with A- and B-Theoretic Models of Branching Spacetime. + venues

Towards a C Theory of Time. + venues